Western civilization owes a lot to Plato. His ideas have influenced philosophers and thinkers of all disciplines. He was the founder of Academia, a centre of learning in ancient Athens and probably the first institution of higher education that we know of. The methodology practiced at Academia and used by Plato in his writings was the “Socratic method”, in honour of his mentor. It is based on dialectic dialogue by the participants in a discussion on a certain topic about which a conclusive result is rarely achieved, and moderated by a master –Socrates in all of Plato’s dialogues. Incidentally, the case method used at many business schools is inspired by this learning methodology as was, for example, recently explained in a Financial Times article on Robert Bruner, Dean of the Darden Business School.
One of the most commented Plato’s dialogues is “Republic”, which is centred on the discussion of what is justice, both from the individual and the public or state perspective. In Book II, Glaucon tells the story of Gyges’ Ring to illustrate his conception of justice. Let me transcript the tale as it is told in the book:
“Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result-when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom.” (Republic, II, 359b-360b).
What would you do if you found a ring with those properties? I hope you don’t agree with Glaucon’s pessimistic view that “no man is so virtuous that he could resist the temptation of being able to steal at will by the ring's power of invisibility”. He even goes further and says that “injustice’s masterpiece is to be seen as a just person without being so (…) that the perfect injustice consists of committing the worst crimes and being able to make oneself recognized as the most honourable”.
Certainly, science has not yet found any object with the magic effects of the mentioned ring, and you may argue that I am philosophising “what if”, but power in business and in other spheres of social life provides its holders with the resources to makeup or hide wrongdoings. Remember Enron, a recent sad episode in corporate history. I do not want to take advantage of a case that has been analysed extensively and judged, their protagonists being imprisoned or sadly dead, but just to extract a lesson that may be useful to all. The managers of Enron enjoyed a sort of Gyges ring: they were able to get the association of accountants, lawyers and major stakeholders and create a sort of invisibility around their mismanagement. When did everything start to go wrong at Enron? Glaucon’s fable is useful here: when the protagonists realised that they were protected by a magic ring that hided their wrongdoings and, more, they were considered by business community exemplary, a sample of the perfect injustice referred above. From there, everything is a slippery slope towards the worse, like in the story of Gyges.
Regrettably, Plato’s “Republic” does not provide, in my opinion, a convincing justification for why to be just. You may find prudential reasons –fear to be punished- or idealistic arguments –the practice of virtue leads to personal happiness-. For the moment, I still find more appealing Kant’s contribution: the duty to be just is a categorical imperative, something that can not be justified on rational accounts in the way you show that water evaporates at 100 degrees Celsius.
Summer series, Tomorrow:
The Arduous Life of Freelancers
H.C. Robbins Landon: “1791: Mozart’s Last Year”
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